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41. INTRODUCTION
1.1. General introduction
This report has been drawn up under Council Decision 94/217/EC of 19 April 19941 on the
provision of Community interest subsidies on loans for small and medium-sized enterprises
extended by the European Investment Bank (EIB, the Bank) under its temporary lending
facility (the SME Facility). The report constitutes an update and enlargement of the fourth
one, which was made available by the Commission on 2 December 1997 (COM(97)645
final). Given that the EIB finalised subsidy payments by the end of 1997, this fifth report
includes an evaluation of the scheme. The Commission intends to make available further
information after the active period of the facility is deemed to have ended and all outstanding
matters have been resolved. At the present time operations involving the recovery of subsidies
are still being recorded.
Statistical information on the final phase of the life of the SME Facility was made available to
the Commission by the EIB in June 1998 with complementary information provided in
September 1998. Available to the Commission have also been the Court of Auditors sector
reports on control missions to the Member States. These missions, with the exception of those
to Sweden and Finland, were attended by Commission representatives.
The SME Facility was established at the Copenhagen European Council (21-22 June 1993),
which invited the EIB to increase the size of its temporary lending facility by ECU 3000
million, of which ECU 1000 million would be allocated to the strengthening of the
competitiveness of European small and medium-sized enterprises. The Ecofin Council was
invited to examine how the part of the appropriations available for SMEs could benefit from
interest-rate subsidies linked to job creation.
The present report analyses the implementation and economic impact of the SME Facility on
job creation so as to produce conclusions on the overall outcome as required in Council
Decision 94/217/EC. In the resolution following the discharge of the general budget for 1995,
Parliament invited the Commission to report, at its earliest convenience, on the management
and efficiency of the scheme, in particular regarding the implementation of the employment
criteria applied. The question of employment criteria, as well as a number of other questions
raised in Parliament’s report on the Commission’s second report on the SME Facility (A4-
0147/96; rapporteur: Mrs. Ewing) are also discussed in the present report.
1.2. The economic climate in the early 1990s 2
The Council’s decision to create this mechanism was taken in a very specific economic
climate which it is as well to bear in mind. The early 1990s were characterised by a deep
recession and a correspondingly gloomy mood.
More specifically, at the end of 1992 the low rate of growth in the economies of all the
member countries of the OECD, which amounted to 1.5% in 1992 compared with 0.8% in
1 O.J. L107, 28.4.94, p. 57. Article 3 of the Decision specifies that the Commission shall send the
European Parliament and the Council a yearly report evaluating the implementation of the Decision.
2 Sources: Statistical Annex of European Economy and reports of The Banque Nationale de Belgique
51991, was not sufficient to realise the long-deferred expectations of a recovery in worldwide
economic activity.
In the Community as a whole economic growth in 1992 was even weaker than in the
preceding years.
At the same time the employment situation showed a marked deterioration, with
unemployment rising to 10.5% of the working population compared with 8.3% in 1990, while
nominal and real interest rates reached very high levels.
In addition, another feature of 1992 was an extremely serious crisis in the EMS, which further
deepened in 1993 and was also a contributory factor in the rise in interest rates for certain
currencies that were the victims of bearish speculation.
These factors naturally had an impact on the behaviour of economic operators in 1992.
Households stepped up their saving ratios and enterprises reduced their debt ratios, which
slowed consumption and led to the deferment of capital expenditure.
The deterioration in the financial situation of the private sector was obviously not without
consequences for credit institutions.
In many cases credit institutions were obliged to be more selective in the granting of loans
and to provide themselves with wider interest spreads. This behaviour, combined with that of
a private sector which was itself endeavouring to keep its level of debt in check, put a damper
on economic activity.
In 1993 the most striking feature of the international economic environment was perhaps the
general feeling of uncertainty. For the third year running growth in the world economy fell
short of expectations, and Europe and Japan remained in recession.
In the European Union, economic activity bottomed out in the first quarter of 1993.
Over the year as a whole, GDP shrank on average by about a quarter percent, with Belgium,
France, Germany and Spain in particular posting below-average results. Only in the United
Kingdom, which had gone into recession much earlier than the rest of the Union, were there
unmistakable signs of a recovery. In almost all the countries in mainland Europe domestic
demand fell, sometimes considerably. The drop in employment and the restrained growth, or
even reduction, in real disposable incomes damped down households’ consumption
expenditure, but it was investment by enterprises that showed the most marked decline, as a
result of the increasing under-utilisation of production capacity, the narrowing of profit
margins and the weakness of demand at home and abroad.
At the end of 1993 the unemployment rate was 10.7% of the working population.
In 1994 economic activity in the industrialised countries picked up again. Nonetheless there
was a further rise in unemployment, to 11.6% of the working population in Europe.
Interest rates, which had been very high at the end of the 1980s, rose again in 1994 after
dropping somewhat in 1993.
To shed some light on this rather special situation, it is worth looking at the analyses made at
the time.
6At the end of 1994, economists were saying that in due course the rise in interest rates could
hold back growth. They considered that, although enterprises relied on forecasts which
differed from those governing the financial markets, they could be forced to give up a number
of investment projects which would offer insufficient returns in view of the interest rate. It
was also thought that if price rises were lower than expected this would subsequently translate
into increased real interest charges, which would damage companies’ cash flow.
Against this highly complex economic background, the decision of the European Council
setting up the Copenhagen mechanism sent business leaders and citizens a message of support
and encouragement for the creation of jobs from the authorities at European level.
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Following the legislative proposal from the Commission3, and the opinion of Parliament of 24
February 19944, the legal basis for extending Community subsidies was enacted by the
Council on 19 April 1994. This Decision specified that the interest subsidies were to be:
– linked to ECU 1 000 million of EIB loans to SMEs in the Community;
– restricted to investment projects involving the creation of jobs;
– fixed at 200 base points (2 %);
– extended to the beneficiaries of the loans for a period of 5 years.
The Decision also indicated that the facility was to be administered by the EIB on behalf of
the Community and that the detailed arrangements for implementing the interest subsidy
mechanism were to be laid down in a co-operation agreement between the Commission and
the EIB. This agreement was signed in Luxembourg on 14 June 1994. In December 1994, the
Commission and the Bank agreed the arrangements for enlarging the SME Facility to
enterprises from the three new Member States (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) from 1 January
1995 onwards. In July 1995, the Commission and the Bank also agreed to extend the Facility
to the end of 1995 and to include specific provisions regarding the re-allocation of unused
subsidies.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SME FACILITY
3.1. EIB global loans
The largest part of EIB lending to projects (70% of operations within the Union in 1997) takes
the form of direct loans, where loan applications are appraised by the Bank's own staff. Direct
lending is generally practised for operations exceeding a certain size (e.g. larger infrastructure
or industrial projects).
For smaller loans, and SME loans in particular, the Bank has recourse to lending procedures
whereby global loan agreements are signed with various financial intermediaries operating in
the Member States. These intermediaries are then entitled to draw upon EIB resources up to
3 COM(93)332 of 9.7.93, subsequently amended by COM(93)577 of 16.11.93 (O.J. C10, 14.1.94, p.13).
4 O.J. C114, 25.4.94
7certain ceilings for the purpose of extending sub-loans to projects which are in conformity
with the rules and conditions laid down in the global loan agreement. The financial
intermediaries carry out the project appraisal (subject to criteria previously agreed upon with
the Bank and to subsequent EIB approval) and handle all relations with the beneficiaries. The
intermediaries are furthermore responsible vis-à-vis the Bank for the full and timely
repayment of the global resources on-lent to the final beneficiaries. For the SME Facility the
role of the financial intermediaries was largely comparable, as they assessed all individual
applications as to whether they were eligible for sub-loans.
3.2. The role of national agents
In most Member States, the management of the interest subsidies was entrusted to a single
national agent per country. These agents acted under the Bank's supervision and processed all
requests for subsidies within one country; the final beneficiaries generally had no direct
contacts or links with the agent in question, as the latter received all the necessary information
through the financial intermediaries. In some countries, however, the agent could also be an
intermediary.
The agents ensured that approved applications for subsidies were registered and processed in
sequence on a "first come, first serve" basis firstly on a main list and secondly, in order to
provide for the possibility that not all operations would go ahead, on a reserve list. They were
also responsible for the processing and verification of the evidence which the beneficiaries
were asked to submit in relation to job creation, as well as for the actual payment (and
whenever needed the recovery) of the subsidy. The agents therefore played an important role
in ensuring that potential and actual beneficiaries were treated in a uniform way and that all
administrative procedures linked to the verification and payment of the subsidy requests were
handled promptly consistently.
For these services, the agents received a remuneration of 1% of the subsidies disbursed.
3.3. Agreements with intermediaries and agents
As soon as the legal framework for extending Community subsidies was in place, the Bank
signed the necessary agreements with financial intermediaries during the second half of 1994,
either by amending global lending arrangements which were already in existence or by
signing new agreements.
The EIB appointed the national agent for each Member State after consultation with national
authorities. In Ireland where no agent had been appointed, the Bank assumed this role. In
agreement with the Commission, each agent was assigned an initial allocation from the total
facility so as to allow it to start operations; a subsequent (and final) allocation was assigned in
the course of April 1995 on the basis of the actual commitments for the first tranche. As
agreed between the Commission and the EIB in July 1995, the uncommitted balance of the
Facility, which only amounted to 1.65 % of its total size, was redistributed between countries
on 15 December 1995 in favour of applicants on the reserve lists. The SME Facility was thus
fully committed by the end of 1995.
3.4. Characteristics of the subsidised SME loans
The subsidised sub-loans (SME loans) granted by the financial intermediaries to the
beneficiaries were limited to ECU 30.000 times the number of jobs created. If the loan request
exceeded this maximum amount (e.g. if a loan of ECU 200.000 was applied for but only 5
8new jobs were created), the loan amount above the ceiling imposed by the number of jobs
created (ECU 50.000 in the example) was unsubsidised.
Inversely, if the loan was smaller than the maximum amount (e.g. if a loan of ECU 100 000
was applied for an investment creating 5 additional jobs, although it would allow for a loan
size of up to ECU 150.000 ), the total amount of subsidies was always limited to 10% of the
size of the loan. This explains why the average loan size per job is smaller than ECU 30 000
in certain cases.
Subsidised loans have a maturity of at least 5 years; voluntary repayment is not allowed
during the first 5 years (except upon repayment of the subsidy). The loans could not be
combined with other loans at reduced rates offered by the EIB under other agreements or with
ECSC loans. No restriction was imposed on the loan currency or on the repayment
characteristics (repayment schedule, grace period etc.). Although the EIB could make funds
available at either fixed or floating rates, some financial intermediaries preferred to take only
the fixed-rate option.
3.5. Characteristics of the subsidy
The Council Decision set the subsidy rate at two percentage points. As the loan allocations to
SMEs could be expressed in various currencies and as the loans could also have different
repayment schedules, the actual value of the subsidy could have differed between
beneficiaries, even for an identical loan size. In order to ensure fair and equal treatment of all
beneficiaries, the interest subsidy was therefore calculated and paid on the basis of a notional
5-year bullet loan in ecus. For this type of loan, an interest subsidy of 2 % per annum for a
total of 5 years corresponded in total to 10% of the SME loan amount (i.e. up to ECU 3 000
per job).
In its application for subsidies, the SME had to state the amount of financing required from
the EIB, the capital cost of the investment and the number of jobs it was planned to create,
with only jobs created after 28 April 1994 being eligible.
In order to become eligible to receive a definite subsidy payment, the beneficiary had to
declare in a “bona fide statement” the actual net increase in the number of jobs and that the
additional jobs had been in existence for more than six consecutive months prior to the date of
the declaration. If the actual job creation was below that planned the subsidies were reduced
accordingly. In the opposite case – more jobs created than originally envisaged – the subsidies
were limited to the number of jobs in the application. Moreover, for the subsidy to become
payable, the subsidised loan had to have been actually disbursed and the first interest payment
had to have fallen due.
3.6. Incentives for early job creation
In view of the objectives of the SME Facility (rapid job creation with sustenance of growth
through productive investment), special incentives were offered to applicants so as to
encourage early job creation and rapid execution of investment plans. Firstly, the applications
for subsidised loans from the SME Facility had to be received by a certain deadline (initially
set at 31 July 1995, subsequently postponed to 15 December 1995). In addition, the total
amount of interest subsidies (i.e. up to ECU 3 000 per extra job) was generally made available
to the beneficiaries in a single payment, as soon as the eligibility conditions outlined in
paragraph 3.5. had been met. In Germany and Spain, the beneficiary did not receive a cash
9payment, but the subsidy was applied by the Intermediary to reduce the outstanding loan
capital.
While applicants had a clear incentive to go ahead as soon as possible with their planned
recruitment, experience shows that the creation of new jobs may take considerable time (e.g.
because the jobs are linked to the implementation of an extensive investment programme).
Applicants had therefore some flexibility regarding the timing for introducing their requests
for the subsidy. In any event, jobs had to have been created no later than 31 December 1996,
and the beneficiaries had to have submitted requests for subsidy payment no later than 30
June 1997.
3.7. Improving the take-up of loans
In order to prevent subsidies available under the present mechanism from being ineffectively
or only partially used, two specific provisions existed as regards the re-allocation of unused
credits. Each of these redistribution mechanisms was based on the reserve lists which national
agents were allowed to constitute if there was strong demand in their country for loans from
the Facility.
One re-allocation mechanism operated across countries and allowed for the apportioning of
any indicative shares which were still unallocated by 15 December 1995 in favour of
applicants in countries which had a reserve list (cf. section 3.3 above). This one-time
redistribution occurred on the basis and in the sequence of the dated application record
maintained by the national agents.
The second type of re-allocation took place on a continuous basis, exclusively among
applicants within the same country. Applicants on the reserve list who had satisfied all the
necessary conditions regarding job creation hereby gained the possibility of receiving the
subsidies which had initially been set aside for other applicants, in particular when the latter
appeared to have overestimated the number of jobs which they would be able to create within
the imposed time frame. This re-allocation process was completed at the end of September
1997.
3.8. Priority for small SMEs
The EIB's customary global lending arrangements with its financial intermediaries define
SMEs as enterprises with net fixed assets not exceeding ECU 75 million , less than 500
employees and not more than one third of the equity owned by a company which is not an
SME.
The Commission’s criteria are different: the number of employees is limited to 250 for SMEs
and 50 for small businesses.
In the framework of the SME facility, the agents and intermediaries were asked to put special
emphasis on smaller enterprises, particularly the ones having not more than 250 employees,
and either a turnover not exceeding 20 million ECU or total assets not exceeding ECU 10
million.
In order to favour these smaller enterprises, at least 60 % of the number of beneficiaries of
subsidised loans should belong to this category. In addition, the size of the SME loans to
enterprises in this category was unrestricted, while subsidised loans to larger SMEs were
limited to ECU 810 000 (corresponding to the creation of 27 jobs).
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3.9. State aid rules
The SME Facility was compatible with state aid rules applying in the Member States and
complied with the Community rules for accelerated clearance5 that specify limitations on the
amount of aid which can be granted, notably in relation to the total size of the investment
cost, the amount of aid per job created etc. In view of the relatively limited amounts of aid
granted, administrative controls in relation to state aid could thus be kept to a strict minimum.
3.10. Control and supervision
The agents verified the entitlement of each beneficiary for its respective subsidy on the basis
of the declarations made by the intermediaries and beneficiaries. Besides the usual monitoring
of its global loans, the Bank also carried out sample checks on the documentary evidence
presented in relation to the requests for subsidy payments. In 1996, 1997 and 1998, the EIB
has monitored the procedures applied by the agents in 11 countries. In the event that
documents presented or statements made by a beneficiary were materially incorrect or
misleading, particularly in connection with elements allowing the verification of job creation,
the payment of subsidies would be cancelled and the beneficiary would be required to repay
to the intermediary institution the amounts received.
The Bank had made appropriate arrangements with the agents and intermediaries to allow the
Court of Auditors to exercise its mission and to verify the regularity of the interest subsidy
payments.
3.11. Promotion of the SME Facility
The promotion and success of the SME Facility depended to a considerable extent on the
wide availability of information about its existence and operation, particularly among
potential beneficiaries.
The Commission and the EIB devoted special attention to this aspect and prepared an
information brochure summarising the purpose and operation of the interest subsidy
mechanism, as well as the list of intermediaries to whom applications should be addressed.
The brochure was available in all Community languages and was distributed through the
network of financial intermediaries taking part in the mechanism. In addition, the Euro Info
Centres were invited to play an active role in disseminating information about the Facility and
the procedures for taking part in it. Certain national agents and intermediaries organised
additional measures in agreement with the EIB designed to address the relevant markets and
to raise awareness.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
4.1. Allocation of Resources
As at 8 June 1998, the total amount of subsidies made available to SMEs in the Member
States amounted to ECU 92.3 million6. This figure is still subject to a limited downward
5 Communication to the Member States on the accelerated clearance of aid schemes for SMEs and of
amendments to existing schemes (92/C213/03 of 2.7.92); O.J. C213, 19.8.92, p. 10.
6 The analysis in this report is based on figures provided by the EIB dated 8 June 1998. Figures in
national currencies have been translated into ecus using end-1997 exchange rates.
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revision. Cancellations of operations resulting in the recovery of subsidies will continue as
long as there are SME loans outstanding. The breakdown of total subsidies between the
Member States is given in Table 1. below.
Table 1. Subsidies disbursed
Member State Subsidies disbursed,
ECU
Member State Subsidies disbursed,
ECU
Belgium 2 188 792 Luxembourg 114 000
Denmark 1 236 707 Netherlands 2 855 000
Germany 20 445 336 Portugal 321 780
Greece 1 429 887 UK 19 840 000
Spain 12 535 766 Austria 950 000
France 13 860 096 Finland 684 249
Ireland 384 346 Sweden 1 035 514
Italy 14 440 000 EU-15 92 321 473
4.2. Planned and actual job creation
The impact of the SME Facility on the creation of additional jobs has been carefully
monitored. Subsidy disbursements were finalised by the end of 1997. Although there are
significant variations between countries, the information based on the situation as at 8 June
1998 gives implementation results of the SME Facility as follows.
• The actual number of new jobs created was 53 789, which exceeded by 11.8% the planned
job creation of 48 077 promised in the applications for subsidies. The minimum number of
jobs corresponding to the ECU 1 000 million of loans possible under the Facility, would
have been 33 333.
• The number of final beneficiaries in the 15 Member States was 4 336.
• Total subsidies disbursed amounted to ECU 92.3 million corresponding to a subsidised
loan volume of ECU 923 million. Compared to the total resources for the SME Facility of
subsidised EIB loans of ECU 1 000 million and interest subsidies of ECU 100 million , the
final utilisation rate was 92.3%.
• The total investment volume associated with the Facility was approximately ECU 3 800
million, and the average individual investment ECU 890 000.
• The interest-rate subsidies disbursed corresponded to approximately 2.4% of the capital
cost of the investments. Under the rules of the Facility, the subsidy available could have
been up to 7.5% of the capital cost of the investment, provided that the beneficiary
borrowed the maximum permitted loan amount and created the maximum number of jobs
eligible for subsidies.
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• Average investment per job created was approximately ECU 74 450 and the average
subsidy per job ECU 1 716. The highest possible subsidy per job would have been ECU
3 000.
The fact that the actual job creation turned out to be higher than the planned job creation
could suggest that the overall improving economic conditions played an important role in the
increased investment and job creation.
The job-creation results of the SME Facility at Member State level are summarised in the
table below:
Table 2. Job creation results
Member
State
Actual job
creation
Planned job
creation
Number of final
beneficiaries
Average subsidy per
job created, ECU
Belgium 1520 802 100 1440
Denmark 978 657 36 1265
Germany 8222 8752 886 2487
Greece 605 623 10 2363
Spain 6070 7945 1005 2065
France 9053 6403 976 1531
Ireland 184 218 9 2089
Italy 7844 7204 335 1841
Luxembourg 55 38 3 2073
Netherlands 1373 1115 75 2079
Portugal 273 172 4 1179
UK 15 985 12 805 811 1241
Austria 480 391 21 1979
Finland 445 366 24 1538
Sweden 702 586 40 1475
EU-15 53 789 48 077 4335 1716
The actual number of new jobs exceeded planned job creation by 12%, but there was
substantial variation between the Member States. In Spain, only 76% of planned jobs
materialised and lower than planned job creation was also recorded in Germany, where the
number of actual new jobs reached 94% of the planned figure. There was nothing in the
technical implementation of the facility which would have led to the actual job creation not
reaching the planned level in these countries. Greece and Ireland also produced fewer jobs
than planned, but in these countries the number of operations was too low to provide a basis
for conclusions.
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The average amount of subsidy per job created varied greatly between the Member States. For
instance Germany and the UK each disbursed approximately ECU 20 million, but with widely
different results. In Germany, new jobs associated with the SME Facility received an average
subsidy of ECU 2 487, whereas at the other end of the scale in the UK the new jobs were only
subsidised by an average of ECU 1 241. Figures available would tend to indicate that the
German investments supported by this scheme were more capital-intensive than in those the
UK.
4.3. Allocation and utilisation of the resources of the SME Facility
In the implementation of the programme, the Commission endeavoured to achieve an
equitable distribution of resources between the Member States. To this end, the funds
available were allocated in several stages. Initially, ECU 65 million of the total amount of
ECU 100 million of subsidies available were allocated between the Member States as
indicative country shares on the basis of GDP (20% weighting), unemployment (30%) and
population (50%). In the second stage, in December 1995, the new Member States, Austria,
Finland and Sweden, were allocated a total of ECU 2.78 million of the ECU 35 million that
had not been previously allocated. The proportionate share of the new Member States was
calculated as half of the entitlement of EU-12 in indicative country shares and was allocated
using the same key. The remaining ECU 32.22 million was allocated between the EU-12
countries in April 1995 on the basis of indications provided by the Bank on the demand for
subsidies recorded in the individual Member States. Finally, in December 1995 an amount of
ECU 1.65 million, representing interest earned by funds held on account with the EIB, was
made available to the national agents on the basis of reserve lists of potential beneficiaries.
Within the Member States, the re-allocation of funds was delegated to national agents under
the principles described in paragraph 3.7. The ability of the agents to recycle funds depended
on the existence of a reserve list. In most Member States SMEs which submitted their
applications only after funds had been committed in full were entered on a reserve list to
await the availability of funds either as a result of increased country shares or the cancellation
of operations already committed. In some countries in particular where the overall country
share was low no reserve lists were set up so as to avoid disappointing potential beneficiaries.
In the end, ECU 7.7 million of the ECU 100 million of budgetary funds made available for
subsidies was not taken up and the final utilisation of the SME Facility was 92%. Generally,
in Member States where final utilisation was low this was caused by the initial subsidy
allocations not leading to full disbursements as a result of a number of SMEs cancelling their
participation in the scheme. However, in certain countries where the total amount of funds
available was too small to warrant wider marketing, or the Facility was particularly
uncompetitive in relation to national schemes, the number of applicants was too low to
support full take-up of the funds. The final distribution of disbursed funds between the
Member States is shown in Table 3 overleaf.
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Table 3. Available and utilised resources
Member
State
First
indicative
share of
subsidies
%
Final share
of disbursed
subsidies
%
(A)
Utilisation
Rate
%
Share of new
jobs
%
(B)
Share of new
jobs
compared to
share of
subsidies
(A/B)
Belgium 2.7 3.3 66 2.8 0.85
Denmark 1.4 1.3 95 1.8 1.38
Germany 19.9 25.4 81 15.3 0.60
Greece 2.5 1.7 84 1.1 0.65
Spain 13.2 13.1 95 11.3 0.86
France 16.0 13.9 100 16.8 1.21
Ireland 1.2 0.8 50 0.3 0.38
Italy 15.9 14.4 100 14.6 1.01
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 100 0.1 1.00
Netherlands 3.9 2.9 100 2.6 0.90
Portugal 1.9 0.5 71 0.5 1.00
UK 15.8 19.8 100 29.7 1.50
Austria 1.9 1.0 100 0.9 0.90
Finland 1.5 0.8 88 0.8 1.00
Sweden 2.1 1.1 99 1.3 1.18
EU-15 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.00
Demand and final allocations were influenced by various factors, which were not necessarily
the same in all Member States:
• The position of the intermediary in the relevant market, in particular the strength of its
SME business, and the marketing campaigns undertaken by intermediaries or national
agents could significantly influence demand.
• In some Member States, notably in Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, more generous
national schemes may have reduced interest in the SME Facility.
• In some Member States, the EIB loans to which subsidies were linked were only available
with a fixed interest rate as the Financial Intermediaries preferred to take only that option.
In an environment of falling interest rates, this could help to explain the reduced demand in
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and Spain.
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• In some Member States, the lack of a mechanism for reallocating funds within the country
reduced final take-up. In Belgium and Ireland, fixed amounts were allocated to
intermediaries (as opposed to the agent making funds available on the basis of first come
first serve), meaning that if an intermediary was unable to utilise its full share, the funds
were not be applied elsewhere. In Member States that received a very small share of funds,
generally no reserve lists were set up. Funds released from cancelled operations could
therefore not be re-allocated.
4.4. Investments linked to the Facility
Table 4. Average investments, loans and job creation
Member
State
Average
Investment,
ECU
Average EIB
loan,
ECU
Average
subsidised
loan,
ECU
Average
Investment
per job,
ECU
Average
number of
jobs per
operation
Belgium 1 835 400 691 000 219 000 120 750 15.2
Denmark 897 100 361 000 344 000 33 022 27.2
Germany 1 120 930 241 000 231 000 120 791 9.3
Greece 4 488 890 1 440 000 1 430 000 74 197 60.5
Spain 499 520 185 000 125 000 82 705 6.0
France 383 660 173 000 142 000 41 362 9.3
Ireland 1 997 650 467 000 427 000 97 711 20.4
Italy 2 653 730 1 231 000 431 000 113 335 23.4
Luxembourg 2 951 760 667 000 380 000 161 005 18.3
Netherlands 2 007 070 971 000 381 000 109 636 18.3
Portugal 7 164 340 1 625 000 604 000 104,972 68.3
UK 707 220 391 000 244 000 35 925 19.7
Austria 2 631 930 452 000 452 000 115 147 22.9
Finland 1 072 050 325 000 285 000 57 818 18.5
Sweden 922 500 300 000 259 000 52 564 17.6
EU-15 893 360 348 000 213 000 72 000 12.4
The average size of investments linked to the SME Facility varied substantially from country
to country, as did their apparent labour intensity as shown by Table 4. above. The overall
average investment was ECU893 360, of which 40% was financed by a sub-loan from an EIB
global loan. On average, 61.2% of the sub-loan was subsidised indicating that some
investments were too capital intensive to be eligible for the full subsidies.
As explained earlier in paragraph 3.4., the maximum subsidised loan per job created was ECU
30 000. Under the rules of the SME Facility, the amount of the EIB loan could be up to 75%
of the value of the investment, meaning that investments of up to ECU 40 000 per job could
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be subsidised. This was obviously far less than the average investment per job of ECU 74 450
experienced in the actual implementation of the Facility.
An examination of the results in certain Member States may provide clues to the factors
which may have influenced the size of loans linked to the Facility and the variation in the
apparent cost efficiency of the Facility, i.e. average subsidy per job created (Table 3.).
In Germany, the average investment per job created, ECU 120 791, was the highest in the EU
and was combined with the second lowest number of new jobs per investment. The capital
intensity of the investments was thus high. Average investment amounted to ECU 1 120 930.
EIB global loan rules for this facility allow EIB funds to be used to finance up to 75% of a
project, meaning that the average project would have been eligible for up to approximately
ECU 841 000 of EIB funding. However, on average the EIB funds used amounted to only
ECU 241 000, of which of ECU 231 000, i.e. 96% was subsidised. At the same time the
average subsidy per job created was ECU 2 487, the highest in the EU. These figures suggest
that in Germany promoters chose to finance their investments from sources other than the EIB
global loan sub-loans, but chose to make use of the latter up to the amount that allowed the
maximisation of subsidies received.
In the UK, investments linked to the SME Facility were labour intensive: the Union’s lowest
average investment per job created was combined with a number of jobs per operation which
at 19.7 was high, indicating that the investments were significantly more labour intensive than
the average across the EU. The average investment was ECU 707 220 and the average EIB
loan ECU 391 000, of which ECU 244 000 – or 62.4% – was subsidised. The average
investment per job was a very low ECU 35 925 and the average subsidy per job only ECU
1 241, suggesting that in the UK there was a proportionately high number of strongly job-
creative investments which could not receive the full subsidy of ECU 3000 per job created,
because the investment per job created was less than ECU 40.000 or the aggregate calculated
subsidy exceeded 10% of the SME loan.
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4.5. Size of beneficiary SMEs
Table 5. Size of beneficiary SMEs
Member
State
Number of operations Share of operations
%
Up to 50
employees
51-250
employees
251-500
employees
Up to 50
employees
51-250
employees
251-500
employees
Belgium 72 21 7 72.0 21.0 7.0
Denmark 21 15 0 58.3 41.7 0.0
Germany 662 179 45 74.7 20.2 5.1
Greece 4 6 0 40.0 60.0 0.0
Spain 892 102 11 88.8 10.1 1.1
France 781 184 11 80.0 18.9 1.1
Ireland 8 1 0 88.9 11.1 0.0
Italy 162 137 36 57.3 40.9 10.7
Luxembourg 1 2 0 33.3 67.3 0.0
Netherlands 51 21 3 68.0 28.0 4.0
Portugal 2 1 1 50.0 25.0 25.0
UK 487 294 30 60.0 36.3 3.7
Austria 8 8 5 38.1 38.1 23.8
Finland 15 9 0 62.1 37.5 0.0
Sweden 33 6 1 82.5 15.0 2.5
EU-15 3199 986 150 73.8 22.7 3.5
As outlined in paragraph 3.8., the agents and intermediaries were asked to give special
emphasis to small SMEs, i.e. those with no more than 250 employees whose turnover did not
exceed ECU 20 million or whose assets were less than ECU 10 million. A target of 60% was
set as the minimum share of small SMEs among the final beneficiaries.
Table 5. above shows that the objective of prioritising small SMEs (Cfr. § 3.8 – Priority for
small SMEs) was fully achieved and the target figure for their proportionate share greatly
exceeded. Across the EU, only 3.5% of operations were with SMEs with more than 250
employees. In two countries only, namely in Austria and Portugal, the number of operations
with small SMEs was less than 80% of the total. The number of operations was too low,
however, to draw any relevant conclusions.
Table 5. also shows that the great majority of operations, 74% across the EU, was with SMEs
with less than 50 employees.
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Table 6. Job creation relative to the size of final beneficiaries
Member
State
Share of subsidies
%
Share of new jobs
%
Up to 50
employees
51-250
employees
251-500
employees
Up to 50
employees
51-250
employees
251-500
employees
Belgium 62.0 27.0 11.0 52.7 30.3 16.9
Denmark 36.0 64.0 0.0 29.6 70.4 0.0
Germany 52.8 34.2 13.0 54.0 32.8 13.3
Greece 21.9 78.1 0.0 21.8 78.2 0.0
Spain 75.4 22.1 2.6 76.3 21.0 2.6
France 61.0 35.0 4.0 57.8 38.0 4.2
Ireland 68.0 32.0 0.0 66.0 33.2 0.0
Italy 31.7 50.0 18.3 28.1 50.4 21.6
Luxembourg 13.0 87.0 0.0 12.7 87.3 0.0
Netherlands 34.0 50.0 16.0 34.2 50.0 15.8
Portugal 39.0 36.0 25.0 23.8 19.0 57.1
UK 38.0 54.0 8.0 33.0 57.3 9.7
Austria 17.2 47.8 35.0 29.6 38.1 32.3
Finland 28.0 72.0 0.0 25.8 74.2 0.0
Sweden 65.0 27.0 8.0 55.7 24.1 20.2
EU-15 49.1% 41.2% 9.7% 45.2% 44.0% 10.9%
While it is true that small companies with less than 50 employees created proportionally
fewer jobs than their relative share of subsidies, the job creation efficiency of interest-rate
subsidies was remarkably similar throughout the EU.
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4.6. Sectoral distribution
Table 7. Sectoral distribution of subsidies in EU-15
Sector No. of
Ops
Share
%
Subsidies
ECU
Share
%
Planned
Job
creation
Actual
Job
creation
Share
%
I.Public Infrastructure 30 0.7 505 170 0.5 309 485 0.9
II. Agriculture, forestry,
fishery
25 0.6 353 427 0.4 202 242 0.4
III. Industry
Mining 31 0.7 613 228 0.7 246 239 0.4
Metal production & semi-
processing
18 0.4 629 640 0.7 273 221 0.4
Construction material 78 1.8 2 065 373 2.2 890 983 1.8
Wood industry 216 5.0 5 147 647 5.6 2 539 2 996 5.6
Glass & ceramics 121 2.8 4 773 533 5.2 2 652 2 627 4.9
Chemicals 92 2.1 1 784 233 1.9 813 935 1.7
Metal working & mechanical
engineering
834 19.2 19 046 059 20.6 9 763 11 184 20.8
Construction of transport
equipment
124 2.9 2 480 888 2.7 1 352 1 666 3.1
Electronic & electrical
engineering
190 4.4 5 480 029 5.9 3 729 3 800 7.1
Foodstuffs 287 6.6 8 171 142 8.9 4 151 5 132 9.5
Textiles & leather 168 3.9 3 786 603 4.1 2 215 2 112 3.9
Paper, pulp; printing,
publishing
247 5.7 5 050 160 5.5 2 308 2 533 4.7
Rubber & plastic processing 241 5.6 6 121 136 6.6 3 049 3 210 6.0
Other industries 173 4.0 2 816 376 3.1 1 529 2 121 3.9
Building/Civil engineering 233 5.4 2 943 467 3.2 1 425 1 997 3.7
Total 3 053 70.4 70 909 514 76.8 36 934 41 756 77.6
IV. Trade and services
General (no specification) 2 0.0 58 821 0.1 27 134 0.2
Tourism and leisure 129 3.0 4 303 198 4.7 2 310 1 923 3.6
Research & development 5 0.1 207 571 0.2 80 76 0.1
Private & public sector
services
705 16.3 10 427 051 11.3 5 458 6 332 11.8
Trade 353 8.1 4 765 211 5.2 2 383 2 434 4.5
Waste recovery 27 0.6 691 658 0.7 318 285 0.5
Education 5 0.1 90 244 0.1 55 126 0.2
Health 2 0.0 9 633 0.0 9 8 0.0
Total 1 228 28.3 20 553 387 22.3 10 640 11 318 21.0
Total I. to IV: 4 336 100.0 92 321 473 100.0 48 077 53 789 100.0
SMEs in industrial sectors, with 76,8% of subsidies and 77,6% of job creation were the
predominant beneficiaries of the SME Facility. More than half of the beneficiaries classified
under industry were accounted for by four sectors. Of these, metalworking & mechanical
engineering, with 20.6% of subsidies paid to industry and the same proportion of the
corresponding job creation was the most important. Other significant sectors were foodstuffs,
rubber & plastic processing and electronic & electrical engineering and private and public
sector services.
In certain Member States (Germany, Italy), craft industries, the distributive trades and other
local services were excluded from eligibility for the temporary mechanism because of
instructions from the respective governments.
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However, the table above shows that the subsidies were widely distributed amongst sectors
and that actual job creation compared to share of subsidies was remarkably consistent.
4.7. Role of Intermediaries
In the EU-12 countries most national agents and intermediaries were long-standing EIB
global loan intermediaries and had structures in place for the granting of global loan sub-loans
and the relevant reporting to the EIB. The SME Facility, however, added a significant extra
burden to the usual global loan procedures. The intermediaries were responsible for
distributing information of the availability of interest-rate subsidies, the collection of subsidy
applications, the collection of the bona fide statements on job creation and the payment of the
granted subsidies to the final beneficiaries.
There are still considerable differences in the financial environment for SMEs in the Member
States. The nature of intermediaries therefore varied from country to country. Examples of
countries where the distribution of the Facility could be said to have been particularly
successful are France, the United Kingdom and Sweden, all of which applied different
mechanisms.
• In France, a government institution, Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, acted as agent and
the Facility was available through a network of mainly co-operative banks with the large
commercial banks absent. The success of the Facility appears to have been the result of the
strong SME involvement of the intermediaries.
• In the United Kingdom, the resources available were used in full and a good geographic
coverage was achieved, although one intermediary, who was also the agent Barclays Bank,
distributed 83% of total subsidies. In this case success appears to have been underpinned
by a strong marketing effort by Barclays, including the preparation of specific marketing
literature.
• In Sweden, AB Svensk Exportkredit (SEK), a specialised financial institution owned by
the government and commercial banks, managed the distribution of the subsidies. It acted
as agent, as well as the direct recipient of EIB funding, which it then passed on to the
intermediary banks to fund the SME loans associated with the Facility. The good results
achieved in Sweden appear to have been achieved through a strong campaign by SEK to
publicise the SME Facility.
In addition to the examples mentioned above, Italy and Netherlands, which applied similar
distribution mechanisms, also achieved a wide coverage of their respective SME markets and
were able to make full use of the resources allocated to them, most probably thanks to strong
marketing efforts.
In Spain and Germany, the SME Facility was embedded in existing national schemes
managed respectively by ICO and KfW. This allowed the Facility to be accessed through the
entire banking sector. However, in both countries the actual subsidy was distributed in a way
that reduced its immediate benefit to the SMEs. Contrary to the procedures adopted in other
Member States, in Spain and Germany the subsidy was not paid as an up-front cash payment,
but was used to reduce the outstanding loan capital.
The amount of funds available in an individual Member States appears to have had a
significant effect on the success of the SME Facility. In Denmark, Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Portugal Austria and Finland, whose share of funds ranged between ECU
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114 000 and ECU 1 430 000 , the amount of funds available was so low as to permit only a
limited number of final beneficiaries, which made it neither practical nor cost-efficient to
have a large number of financial intermediaries.
The obligation to recover subsidies in full in the event that the beneficiary elects to repay the
loan before its fifth anniversary may not have been appropriate in the context of this particular
facility.
4.8. Procedures and administrative costs
In essence, the subsidies paid under the SME Facility constituted a bonus for jobs created. By
requiring the potential beneficiaries to submit investment plans and requiring those
investments to be partly financed by EIB global-loan sub-loans, it was possible to ensure that
the scheme was associated with genuine job-creating investments. Also, by means of early
commitment of the available subsidies, the SMEs were encouraged to proceed with their job-
creating investments.
The reliance on bona-fide statements on job creation for the release of subsidies had
advantages and disadvantages. Self certification may increase the possibility of errors and
provides limited protection against misrepresentation. On the other hand, it was intended to
maximise the impact of the subsidies by paying them out to the beneficiaries as early as
possible and limit the administrative costs for SMEs.
In the implementation of the SME Facility, the EIB, the national agents and the intermediaries
shouldered a not inconsiderable administrative burden and were inadequately compensated. In
many cases, the intermediaries created new internal procedures to accommodate the scheme
and produced publicity material at their own expense. The Agents were remunerated and
received fees amounting to 1% of the subsidies disbursed, but the amount could be considered
inadequate in relation to the costs incurred. It is possible that the administrative burden
carried by the intermediaries was underestimated at the time the scheme was launched. For
instance, no provision was made to cover the costs incurred by the intermediaries when
operations had to be cancelled or subsidies recovered.
4.9. Efficiency of the SME Facility as an instrument for job creation
The total amount of resources reserved for the SME Facility, ECU 100 million, corresponds
to a minimum number of new jobs of 33 333. For various reasons discussed earlier, the total
amount of subsidies disbursed was only ECU 93.2 million, but actual job creation was almost
54.000. The number of jobs associated with the scheme thus greatly exceeded the minimum
target.
The cooperation agreement between the Commission and the European Investment Bank
concerning the management of the SME Facility was signed in June 1994, after which the
Bank was able to conclude appropriate arrangements with agents and intermediaries in the
Member States. Most of these were concluded between August and October 1994, as were the
agency agreements. The initial deadline for the submission of applications for subsidies was
the end of July 1995, which was subsequently extended to December 1995. Ideally, the
availability of the subsidies should have encouraged SMEs to assess and launch new job-
creating investments. Some intermediaries have expressed the view that certain investments
may have been brought forward in order for them to benefit from the SME Facility.
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The figures indicating the average level of subsidy also suggest that the subsidy alone could
not have been enough to justify the creation of additional permanent jobs. The average
subsidy per job created was ECU 1 716 and the average total subsidy received by a
beneficiary ECU 21 300 or 2.4% of the capital cost of the average investment.
The Commission would not claim that interest rebates alone are the single determining factor
in a beneficiary’s decision to undertake an investment project. They form part of a package
which includes the loan itself at a lower basic interest rate than would otherwise be obtained
and measures on a local, regional or national level which together facilitate the achievement
of priority Community objectives.
The average size of individual investments was ECU 890 000 and the average number of
associated new jobs 12.4. Given that the majority of beneficiary SMEs were small, the
investments associated with the scheme must be considered as significant for the companies
and likely to involve genuine expansion. It follows that the majority of the new jobs is likely
to have been created with the intention of maintaining them in the longer term. Only
permanent jobs were eligible and the subsidy was paid after the jobs had been in place for six
months, meaning that the staff in question were likely to have completed their probationary
period and benefit from the usual protection against dismissal.
4.10. Advantages and drawbacks of interest-rate subsidies
The SME Facility provided interest-rate subsidies on EIB global loan sub-loans extended to
SMEs subject to certain job-creation criteria being met. As explained in paragraph 3.5., the
2% subsidy was calculated on the basis of a notional 5-year bullet loan, but was paid in full
after the corresponding new jobs had been in existence for six months and the first interest
payment of the underlying loan had become due and payable.
Irrespective of the fact that the subsidy was in reality a reward for creating new jobs, it was
only available for SMEs that were borrowers of EIB global loan sub-loans. The link to
borrowing indirectly linked the subsidies with investments. This, in turn, made it more likely
that the jobs subsidised were sustainable.
Under the global loans, the EIB extends loans to financial intermediaries for on-lending to
SMEs. The credit risk of the global loan sub-loans is carried by the financial intermediary in
full. This could mean that the volume of loan finance available to SMEs was not increased but
was on more advantageous terms.
The addition of these subsidies to EIB global loans also provided a distribution channel
through the EIB existing global loan banks. This avoided the necessity of creating a totally
new conduit for the subsidies. Job-creating investments for which SMEs raised finance from
other sources were not concerned and could not benefit from the subsidies of the SME
Facility.
As already mentioned in section 3.4, for each new job created a loan of up to ECU 30 000
was eligible to be subsidised. Given that up to 75% of the capital cost of the investment could
be financed by an EIB global loan sub-loan, the maximum investment per job eligible for full
support was ECU 40 000. Compared to the actual average investment per job of ECU 74 450,
this was a low figure and resulted in a low average actual subsidy per job.
The beneficiary SME received the subsidy only after it had fulfilled all the conditions of the
facility, i.e. the jobs subsidised had been in existence for a period of six months and the first
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interest payment of the loan financing the underlying investment had become due and payable
The rules of the SME Facility stipulated that in the event that a final beneficiary elected to
repay a loan before its fifth anniversary, the corresponding subsidies became repayable in full.
This requirement may appear overly strict in a situation where interest rates are rapidly
declining and beneficiaries wish to make alternative arrangements.
In order to ensure the rapid implementation of the scheme, the procedures were not
unnecessarily complex, involving only an application and a bona fide statement after job
creation.
The distribution system through existing channels permitted the rapid implementation of the
scheme in all Member States but limited in some instances the flexibility of the instrument
and created minor differences in implementation throughout the Community.
The decision of the Copenhagen summit concerning the SME Facility was taken in June
1993. At that time economic growth had slowed in most Member States (Cf. section 1.2.
Introduction – General economic climate). The final decision with details of implementation,
scope and volume was enacted only in April 1994. The Facility had generally become fully
operational by autumn 1994 when the European economies had started to recover.
Additionally, interest rates started to fall in most Member States and there was an expectation
– subsequently fulfilled – that the decline in rates would continue.
5. BUDGETARY ASPECTS
Budgetary appropriations for the payment of interest subsidies amounted to ECU 65.5 million
for 1994, which were transferred to the Bank in the course of 1994. In 1995, appropriations
amounting to ECU 2.75 million were approved and paid out of the 1995 budget. The
Commission proposed an amount of ECU 7.75 million in the PDB for 1996, which was paid
out in early 1996. Following budgetary appropriations by Parliament on the budgetary line,
another ECU 17.5 million was paid out in late 1996 to cover the cost of the Facility in full.
In total the Facility was credited with ECU 93.5 million, which was almost completely
disbursed to the beneficiaries. were transferred back to the budget in 1998. On 31.12.1998 the
balance on the Community account was ECU 656 476.
All financial resources entrusted to the EIB for the payment of interest subsidies were credited
to a special Community account within the Bank; interest earned on the account has been and
will be credited monthly. It appears likely that the Community account will have to be
maintained for several more years to receive of subsidy payments recovered.
6. OUTSTANDING ISSUES
The requests for payment of subsidies had to be submitted no later than 30 June 1997, at
which time the SME loan had to have been actually disbursed and the first interest payment
had to have fallen due. Assuming an interest period of six months, the final SME loans would
have been disbursed at the end of 1996, meaning that the five-year period during which they
cannot be repaid without the subsidy also becoming repayable ends at the end of 2001. The
aggregate number of cancelled operations may therefore continue to increase for several more
years and the administrative structures for reclaiming subsidies and returning them to the
Community account with the EIB and subsequently to the Community budget will have to
remain in place probably until the middle of 2002.
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The SME Facility excluded SMEs that benefited from other loans offered by the EIB under
other agreements or ECSC loans. A small number of cases where the SME Facility was
combined with ECSC funding have come to light, and work is in progress by the Commission
and EIB departments to determine the exact nature of such operations and to take appropriate
remedial action.
It also appears that subsidy payments have been made to final beneficiaries that may not have
met the conditions of the SME Facility in full. The most important types of anomalies are
cases where the number of jobs created was lower than declared and cases where excess
subsidies were paid because VAT was included in the investment cost. The EIB, in
cooperation with the agents and intermediaries is in the process of assessing the extent of this
practice with a view to taking action for the proportional recovery of subsidies.
7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1. Achievements
The SME facility was successful in achieving its objectives at little cost. Across the EU it
helped create nearly 54 000 new jobs, which exceeded substantially the minimum target of
33 333. With this employment being linked to growth through investment, the sustainability
of the new jobs is likely to be high. This figure represents only the jobs created directly and
takes no account of indirect job creation.
Although there were significant variations between Member States, the average subsidy for
each new job was only ECU 1 716 and represented extremely good value for money. With
average investment per job at ECU 72 000, the facility supported some ECU 3 800 million of
job-creating investment in a wide range of industrial and service sectors.
The target of 60% of final beneficiaries being the smaller SMEs with under 250 employees
was also substantially exceeded, with over 96% falling into this category and over 73%
actually having fewer than 50 employees.
The EIB’s use of its existing global loan intermediaries enabled the facility to be rapidly
implemented with correspondingly rapid job creation.
7.2. Lessons to be learned
The figures show that implementation was not even throughout the EU. In some countries the
allocation of subsidy was probably too small to merit an extensive marketing exercise. There
was also a relatively heavy administrative burden for little or no remuneration on the EIB,
agents and global-loan intermediaries. It might therefore be appropriate in any future scheme
of this nature for the Commission to maintain responsibilities for managing the subsidies.
As regards the final beneficiaries, the fact that loans could not be repaid early during a period
of falling interest rates without total loss of subsidy was not well regarded and a pro-rata loss
could have been more appropriate.
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In hindsight the self-certification of job creation would appear to have its drawbacks and may
in some cases have resulted in excess jobs being declared.
As is usual with global loan schemes it is the financial intermediary that carries the entire
credit risk. Whilst this has the advantage that the Community has no likelihood of loss due to
default on the loan it is possible that some of the financially weaker SMEs may not therefore
have had access to these loans and the associated subsidy. The Commission has taken this into
consideration in drawing up subsequent schemes, notably those providing guarantees.
